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Japan occupied the Paracel and Spratly Islands in 1939 and an-
nexed both islands into the administrative jurisdiction of Taiwan.  After 
World War II, the troops of the Republic of China were responsible for 
receiving both of the islands upon the surrender of the Japanese army.  
On April 28, 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force and 
the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty was signed, with both treaties stipulating 
that Japan renounce the right, title and claim to the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands.  According to the principle of uti possidetis and occupation, the 
Republic of China has had the priority right of occupation to hold the 
right of sovereignty to both islands since that critical date.
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*   *   *
The South China Sea has been in tumult for more than eighty 
years.  According to the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, each coastal state was to submit claims for the outer 
limits of its continental shelf before May 13, 2009.  The territorial dis-
putes among related countries in regard to the South China Sea flared up 
again when the continental shelf limits were respectively submitted by the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam.  All the countries around the South 
China Sea claim that they own the sovereignty of the islands or islets in 
the South China Sea by law, and so it is hard to imagine that this conflict 
will be resolved.
This paper tries to frame historical records and the concept of in-
ternational law as the level of analysis.  Since WWII, several adjudicate 
cases by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have manifested a very 
important trend regarding the ownership of territorial sovereignty.  This 
trend can be summarized on the basis of two principles; one is the historical 
claim and title, and the other is the effectivités of governance.  For ex-
ample, a majority decision of judges of the ICJ was based upon the two 
above-mentioned principles from the Sipandan and Ligitan case, Indonesia 
vs. Malaysia in 2002, and the Pedra Branca case, Singapore vs. Malaysia 
in 2008.
There are some scholars whose efforts to clarify the complicated 
problems of territorial disputes in the South China Sea provide various 
viewpoints regarding the historical context, international relations and 
international law in order to untie the knot.  Among them, Hungdah Chiu 
& Choon Ho Park analyzed the territorial disputes from the perspective 
of history and international law.  They emphasized that China has a more 
affirmative inchoate title for discovering and using the Paracel Islands 
longer than Vietnam.  Based on the principle of prescription, they argued 
that Vietnam’s occupation did “not even approximate the requirement of 
‘continuous and undisturbed exercise of sovereignty over [a territory].’ 
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Its actions concerning the Paracels were sporadic and were frequently 
challenged by China.”1  They also took the view of Chinese discovery 
and historic use of or settlement on these islets to rebut the arguments of 
France and Vietnam regarding the Spratly Islands.  Doubtless, their view-
points in relation to international law are considered by researchers to be 
more heuristic.
To selectively provide the historic documents, this paper focuses on 
two significant events which are important to the South China Sea dis-
putes in the conduct of this research.  First, Japan occupied the Paracel 
and Spratly Islands in the prewar period and placed the two island groups 
under the jurisdiction of Taiwan.  Second, Japan renounced the two island 
groups as a stipulation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
In terms of the paragraph of Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, September 8, 1951: “Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to 
the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.”  The treaty came into force 
on April 28, 1952.
Accordingly, there are three dimensions of the territorial issue, 
which relate to disputes arising from China, France and Japan.  These 
dimensions are discussed in this paper and involve the use of historic re-
cords.
First, a French warship invaded the Paracel Islands in 1925.  In 
1931, France and China disputed the territorial authority of the Paracel 
Islands.
Second, starting in 1933, there was a dispute over the territorial au-
thority of the Spratly Islands among Japan, France, and China.
Third, Japan renounced the Paracel and Spratly Islands according 
to the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951.  What does this 
action on the part of Japan mean under international law?  The San Fran-
cisco Peace Treaty came into force and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty 
was signed on April 28, 1952.  Could the effective date of both treaties as 
1Hungdah Chiu and Choon-Ho Park, “Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands,” 
Ocean Development and International Law Journal 3, no. 1 (1975): 1-28.
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a critical date2 be the basic date on which to judge who owns the Paracel 
and Spratly Islands?
Several kinds of ideas and concepts of international law can be 
used to analyze the issue of territorial sovereignty.  In this paper, in order 
to concentrate on core theory-building, a “critical date” is selected as a 
conceptual tool to discern the qualifications of the disputing parties in 
connection with the historical records used to support the arguments.  By 
using that conceptual tool, the qualification of the disputing party will be 
determined in the game of the territorial dispute.
The “critical date” is the key date of causing the conflicts among the 
relevant countries.  The action or proof that is provided by each country 
before the date will be able to become a basis to judge the territorial own-
ership, and likewise after the date.  However, some scholars have argued 
that action taken after the date is helpful to consolidate the legal position 
of the territory that is claimed by the country involved, and thus such ac-
tion should be considered or adopted.  As to which date is the critical date 
should depend on the judge’s decision.  The judge has the power to decide 
which day the critical date should be on.3
However, because both the coming into force of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty and the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty took 
place on April 28, 1952, does that day become the critical date or not? 
What is the legal effect caused by the same day when the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands were renounced?  The legal effect caused by the renounce-
ment of the islands deserves to be given weight.  This paper vouches for 
April 28, 1952 to serve as the critical date, as the foundation of this dis-
cussion.
Selecting 28 April 1952 as the “critical date” is based on the follow-
ing considerations.
2Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 35; Robert Yewdall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963), 31.
3Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 94-95.
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First, the San Francisco peace conference was an international con-
ference; its decisions have validity and reliability in terms of international 
law.
Second, during the conference, there was a dispute over the Paracel 
and Spratly Islands.  The draft of the peace treaty was distributed to the 
members of the conference before the meeting.  The representative of 
the Soviet Union proposed a motion that the People’s Republic of China 
owned the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands.  However, the motion 
failed in the voting.  Even the representative of Vietnam argued that both 
islands should belong to Vietnam; there was no discussion or voting on 
this argument.  The representative of France agreed with the UK’s idea to 
stand for renouncement by Japan.
Third, Japan renounced both islands occupied during WWII; that 
means by doing so those lands should be “terra nullius”.
Fourth, due to the conflict of representation between the Republic 
of China and People’s Republic of China, neither country was invited to 
attend the peace conference.  However, the foreign minister of the PRC, 
Chou Enlai (周恩來), issued a statement on 15 August, which emphasized 
that both islands belonged to the PRC.  On the other hand, the foreign 
minister of the ROC, George K.C. Yeh (葉公超), on 5 February 1952 in-
formed the press that the future Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty should have 
the same content as the San Francisco Peace Treaty.4  This means that the 
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty should include the articles on the Paracel Islands 
and Spratly Islands.  It was realized in the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty.
Fifth, both France and Vietnam were signatory states to the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty and indeed arguable parties on the issues of both 
islands.  The ROC and PRC expressed their arguments outside the confer-
ence.  In terms of international law, these four parties simultaneously be-
came new disputing parties on 28 April, 1952, the date the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty took effect.
4“The ROC Should Take the San Francisco Peace Treaty as a Model of the Sino-Japanese 
Peace Treaty,” Taiwan minshengri bao (Taiwanese People’s Sound Daily), February 6, 
1952, P1.
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Since the territorial disputes in the South China Sea are going to in-
volve legal appeals among the disputing parties, for example, the Philip- 
pines has brought its dispute with China to the Arbitral Tribunal of the 
United Nations, clarifying the legal basis will positively contribute to a 
peaceful resolution in the South China Sea area.
Governing of the Paracels
On May 15, 1909, during the Qing Dynasty, the then governor-
general of Yuè (Guangdong) Province, Chang Renjun (張人駿), sent Gen-
eral Lee Jun (李準), a Guangdong naval commander, to patrol, name the 
islands, and draw a map of the Paracel Islands.  Afterwards, the Paracel 
Islands were governed by Yat (崖) county, Guangdong Province.5  France 
challenged the sovereignty of the Paracels with a note verbale to China in 
1931.  The Chinese government rebutted the arguments put forward by 
France and disagreed with this dispute by means of a submission to the Per- 
manent Court of Arbitration.  The French Governor-General of Indochina in 
June 1938 gave an order which was to establish the Paracel Islands Rep-
resentative Office (Délégation des Paracels) that would be administered 
by Thua Thien province.6  Japan occupied the Paracels in March 1939 and 
placed it under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Taiwan authorities.
After Japan’s surrender, the authority of the South China Sea Is-
lands was put under the jurisdiction of the Taiwan Executive Office of 
the Governor from December 1945 to July 12, 1946.7  In July 1946, the 
Chinese Executive Yuan decided to transfer the authority of the Spratlys 
5Tian Shi Chen, Compilation of Files of the Paracel and Pratas Islands, Files of the Paracel 
Islands (Shanghai: The Commercial Press LTD, 1928), 3-4.
6The Republic of Vietnam Embassy in Taipei, “Sovereignty of Vietnam over the Paracel 
Islands,” Vietnamese News, no. 9, March 15, 1959, 1-7; Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty 
over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, 110.
7Academia Historica, “Not Delimited Island Case,” File of Taiwan Province Adminis- 
trative Official Government, Collection No. 00315800010001, July 12, 1946, http:// 
163.29.208.22:8080/adminShowImage/connect_img.php?s=496100350003&e=2.
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and Paracel Islands to Guangdong Province.  On January 7, 1947, China 
announced that they had taken over the Paracel Islands and the Spratlys. 
However, the French Embassy in China protested against the announce-
ment by China.
On February 18, 1947, the Viet Minh, an executive parties alliance 
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, broadcasted through the media 
that the French Premier proclaimed that the agreement between France 
and Vietnam was abrogated on March 6, 1946, and claimed that it was 
impossible for the Viet Minh to take part in the French Union government 
and that they would fight for Vietnamese independence.  The Viet Minh 
also denounced the action taken by France to compete for the Paracel Is-
lands as unjustifiable.8
When the Chinese Communist Party established its regime on Octo-
ber 1, 1949, soldiers of the Republic of China retreated from the Paracel 
Islands to Taiwan on May 8, 1950 out of tactical considerations.  How-
ever, the Republic of China did not renounce its authority over the Paracel 
Islands at that time or later.
Governing of the Spratly Islands
Japan was the second country9 to investigate the phosphorous guano 
on the Spratly Islands in 1917, including Itu Aba Island, the Northeast and 
Southwest Islands, West York Island, and Thitu Island, respectively.  On 
May 13, 1919, two businessmen, Keisaburo Hashimoto (橋本圭三郎) and 
Wuluji Kamiyama (神山閏次), petitioned the Japanese Foreign Minister, 
Kosai Uchida (內田康哉), that the Spratly Islands should be annexed into 
8“Vietminh Broadcasts to Fight Forever for Independence and Refutes the Irrational Con-
test for the Paracel Islands,” People News, February 19, 1947, P1.
9The first country was the United Kingdom which exploited the phosphorous guano in 
Spratly Island and Amboyna Cay in 1877.  See “Spratley (or Storm) Island and Amboyna 
Cay Island, Borneo: Establishment of British Claim to Sovereignty,” National Archives 
of the United Kingdom, date range: January 1, 1931-December 31, 1933, Reference: TS 
27/808.
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the domain of Japan with the aim of exploitation.10  On June 10, 1919, 
the Laza Island Phosphorous Mine Corporation registered with the Tokyo 
District Court in order to obtain the mining rights for the islands.  It was 
the first time that the Spratly Islands came under Japanese administrative 
jurisdiction.  In particular, the permission for mining was granted by the 
Japanese government.
In 1929, the mining industry was greatly influenced by the world 
economic recession, and so the Laza Corporation terminated its mining 
activity and sent back three officers and one hundred and thirty workers 
to Japan.11  As a consequence, the Laza Corporation withdrew its mining 
business from the Spratly Islands.  On April 13, 1930, the French gunboat 
“Malicieuse” occupied Spratly Island (de La Tempete) and nearby reef 
islands.  The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not approve the occu-
pation originally, but finally they were forced to accept the fact.12  On July 
15, 1933, France announced that it had occupied nine islands of the Sprat-
ly Islands, including Caye d, Amboine, Spratly, Itu Aba, Namyit, Loaita, 
Lan Kian Cay, Thitu, N. E. Caye, and S. W. Caye.  On July 26, France 
published the information regarding the annexed islands in the Journal 
Officiel de la Republique Francaise.  On December 21, France decided 
to put those annexed islands under the administration of Baria Province, 
Cochinchina.13  The Chinese government and the Japanese government 
10Tatsuo Urano, ed., Materials System of Political and Social History of Asia-Africa Inter-
national Relations (in Japanese), Vol. 2, No. 5i (Tokyo: Babirus Publishing, 2007), 4820. 
http://rnavi.ndl.go.jp/mokuji_html/000008525365.html; http://www.jacar.go.jp/DAS/
meta/listPhoto?IS_STYLE=eng&ID=M2006092115163839910.
11For the activities of the Japanese in the Spratly Islands, please see Wun-iji Yamamoto (山
本運一), ed., Shinnan Islands (Taipei: Ichi Susumu Printing, 1939), 9-11; Toyosei Fujii 
(藤井豐政), “The Possession of Shinnan Islands,” Chuokoron (中央公論) (Tokyo) 5, no. 
622 (June 1939): 154-58; Chieushi Wakabayashi (若林修史), “Past and Present of the 
Shinnan Islands,” Taiwan Times Pao, no. 234 (May 1939): 190-203; Taro Yamashita (山
下太郎), “The Records of Exploration in the Shinnan Islands (I)” Taiwan Times Pao, no. 
235 (June 1939): 190-95; Taro Yamashita (山下太郎), “The Records of Exploration in 
the Shinnan Islands (II),” Taiwan Times Pao, no. 236 (July-August 1939): 165-75.
12Stein Tønnesson, “The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline,” Modern Asian 
Studies 40, no. 1 (February 2006): 5.
13Ulises Granados, “As China Meets the Southern Sea Frontier: Ocean Identity in the Mak-
ing, 1902-1937,” Pacific Affairs 78, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 451.
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made an official announcement reacting to the occupation by France.
On December 21, 1934, the Review Board of the Water and Land 
Map of China passed a resolution that confirmed that the Spratly Islands 
and the Paracels belonged to China and published a formal map of four 
island groups in the South China Sea, its domain of the southernmost part 
being located at James Shoal.14 
Japan dispatched troops to occupy the Spratly Islands on January 7, 
1939.  France demanded that the dispute be submitted to the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, but Japan did not approve the proposal.  Besides, 
Japan, in light of its planned policy, decided to transfer the administration 
of the Spratly Islands to the Office of the Governor-General of Taiwan.15
On March 30, the No. 122 official notice posted by the Governor-
General of Taiwan stated that the Spratly Islands were under the adminis-
tration of the Office of the Governor-General of Taiwan and were named 
the Shinnan Islands (Spratly Islands) District, Kaohsiung City, Kaohsiung 
County.  The scope of the Spratly Islands is encircled by the longitude 
and latitude listed below: (1) 12°N, 117°E; (2) 9°N, 117°30′E; (3) 8°N, 
116°E; (4) 7°N, 114°E; (5) 7°N, 111°30′E; (6) 9°N, 111°30′E; (7) 12°N, 
114°E.16  The Spratly Islands is composed of thirteen main islands and 
islets: North Danger S. W.; North Danger N. E.; West York; Flat; Thi 
Tu; Loaita; Itu Aba; Spratly; Amboyna; Nam-yit; Sin Cowe; Sand Cay; 
Nanshan.17
On March 31, the Japanese government informed the French Embas-
sy stationed in Japan of its annexation of the Spratly Islands.  However, 
France and the United Kingdom were against this annexation.
14Jindai lishi shang Zhongguo zhengfu wei Nanhai zhudao mingming de qingkuang” (The 
naming of islands of South China Sea by the Chinese government in modern history), 
Duowei xinwen (DWnews), June 16, 2011, http://history.dwnews.com/big5/news/2011 
-06-16/57814793.html.
15The Kashima Peace Research Institute, ed., A History of Japan Diplomacy, Vol. 22, (To-
kyo: The Society of Publication of the Kashima Peace Research Institute, 1975), 27-32.
16“Stationed Army in the Paracel and Spratlys,” Ministry of Interior, Republic Of China, 
No.404.12/1, Tsun Lu No.14164, April 17, 1947, Appendix: Brief introduction of Shin-
nan Islands, Showa Year 14, July 17, Report Book.
17Fujii, “The Possession of Shinnan Islands,” 154-58.
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After WWII, the Chinese government dispatched, on December 9, 
1946, the warships “Tai-pin” and “Chong-yeh” to the Spratly Islands, 
and the warship “Tai-pin” landed on Itu Aba Island and patrolled Loaita 
Island, Thitu Island, Northeast and Southwest Cay, and Triton Island.  On 
December 1, 1947, the Chinese government proclaimed the reintegration 
of the Spratly islands and the Paracels into its administrative jurisdiction.
An Analysis of Renouncement
The director’s special assistant, Robert A. Fearey, of the Office of 
Source:  Ministry of Interior, Republic of China, “Forward into the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands,” File No. 404.13/1, Lu Sen Fu Min No. 64650, September 13, 1947.
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Map 1
The Spratly Islands under the Taiwan Administrative District in 1939
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Northeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs of the U.S. State 
Department, referred to how to deal with the territorial problem of Japan’s 
occupation in a memorandum which A.  Fearey sent to the deputy chief of 
the same Bureau, John M. Allison, on October 26, 1950.  The memoran-
dum noted the following:
“The central and southern Ryukyus, the Bonins, including Roario Island, the 
Volcanos, Parece Vela and Marcus would be placed under the trusteeship sys-
tem of the United Nations with the United States as the administering authority.   
Because of the considerable population of the Ryukyus and the virtual cer-
tainty that strategic trusteeships would be vetoed by the Soviet Union, the 
United States would seek ordinary trusteeships for these islands.  Japan would 
accept the United Nations Security Council action of April 2, 1947 extending 
the trusteeship system to the former Japanese Mandated Islands.  The Treaty 
would contain no reference to Pratas Reef and Island, over which China 
formally reasserted sovereignty in 1947, or to the Paracel Islands or Spratly 
Island, title to which has been disputed between France and China.  While 
Japan also claimed Spratly Island before the war, its claim to this uninhabited 
spot is not believed important enough to warrant mention in the treaty.”18
The view on the status of the Spratly and Paracel Islands taken by 
Britain was to make it ambiguous, maintaining the same as its past claim. 
In October 1947, the Foreign Office of Britain had prepared a dossier of 
decisions for attending the conference in San Francisco.  The internal, not 
public, file itemized that Japan should renounce the right and claim of the 
Spratly Islands and Amboyna Cay, but it was unnecessary to list the name 
of the particular island and to indicate which nation would succeed to the 
renounced island.  Britain was disinclined to compete for the authority of 
the Spratly Islands with France.  However, as long as Britain did not offi-
cially renounce the Spratly Islands, France would not be permitted to con-
trol the islands.  Therefore, the best way to deal with the problem was not 
to ascertain its authority.  In 1949, R. S. Milward who was responsible for 
formulating policies had clearly expressed the British view on the Spratly 
Islands.  He said:
18United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950.  Volume 
VI: East Asia and the Pacific (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 
1328, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS 
.FRUS1950v06.p1342&id=FRUS.FRUS1950v06&isize=M.
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“It has already been agreed at the official level that the Peace Treaty terms of-
fered to Japan should be so worded so as to imply a renunciation of her claim 
to these islands; but this treaty will leave the sovereignty open to dispute 
between Britain, France and any other nations who choose in the future to 
interest themselves in the islands, until the vacuum is filled, and some claim-
ant becomes able to exercise a more real and permanent sovereignty than has 
been possible hitherto.”19
In 1950, the Australian government informally asked whether the 
UK might be prepared to seek trusteeship for the Spratly and neighbor-
ing islands.  On October 24, the Foreign Office replied: “In our view the 
dominant consideration in the disposal of these Islands is their strategic 
importance.  From that point of view, we should not object to the owner-
ship of the Islands by France, but we should not wish their ownership to 
go to Japan, the Philippines, Nationalist China or, particularly, the Central 
People’s Government of China.”20
On September 8, 1951, fifty-one countries attended the Peace con-
ference in San Francisco.  The United States supported the Republic of 
China’s presence at the meeting, but Britain wished that the People’s 
Republic of China would attend.  Finally, the United States and Britain 
reached a compromise, and so the two countries were not invited to the 
conference, yet France and Vietnam who were also involved in the dis-
putes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands assigned their representatives 
to be present at the meeting.
At the San Francisco conference, the deputy minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Soviet Union, Andrei Gromyko, proposed thirteen amend-
ments on September 5.  The first amendment was to suggest that Japan 
should admit the authority of the Paracel Islands and more southern 
islands to be owned by the People’s Republic of China.  However, the 
move was overruled by the vote of 48 to 3 (the three votes were cast by 
the Soviet Union, the Czech Republic, and Poland).  On September 7, the 
19Tønnesson, “The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline,” 42.
20Geoffrey Marston, “Abandonment of Territorial Claims: The Cases of Bouvet and Spratly 
Islands,” The British Yearbook of International Law 57, no. 1 (1986): 337-56, http://groups 
.yahoo.com/group/diendan_binhluan/messages/4187?threaded=1&m=e&var=1&tidx=1.
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Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam, Tran Van Huu who also held the 
position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced in the meeting that 
the Paracel and Spratly Islands belonged to its territory.  There was no 
one who supported the proposal or made a comment about the speech by 
Vietnamese representative.  Hence, they did not reach an agreement on 
the issue of the ownership of the Spratlys and Paracel Islands at the con-
ference.21
Finally, Japan signed a treaty with forty-eight countries, with the ex-
ception of the Soviet Union, the Czech Republic, and Poland.  However, 
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 which specified: “Japan renounces all right, title 
and claim to Taiwan and the Pescardos,” and Paragraph 6: “Japan re-
nounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel 
Islands” had come in for sharp criticism.  The order of the two items in 
the agreement with Japan was only to emphasize the utility of renounce-
ment and not to specify the recipients.  Besides, the Republic of China 
was not a signatory country to the peace treaty.  Due to the reasons men-
tioned above, the renounced Paracel and Spratly Islands were easily mis-
taken to have the status of terra nullius.
Both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China reacted 
to the flaw in the articles of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.  On August 15, 
1951, Chou Enlai, Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China, 
was dissatisfied with the draft of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and 
raised an objection to the treaty; he said: “. . . the draft specified that Japan 
renounced the right to the Spratly and the Paracel Islands without men-
tioning the problem of returning of sovereignty.  Actually, as the whole 
of the Spratly Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Pratas Islands, the Paracel 
Islands and Spratly should be the territory of China.  Even though Japan 
launched a war to successfully occupy the islands, the Chinese govern-
ment has already taken over the islands after Japan surrendered.  Here the 
statement of the People’s Republic of China is that the People’s Republic 
of China had the right to the Spratly and the Paracel Islands which cannot 
21Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, 41. 
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be encroached upon.  Moreover, regardless of the stipulations coming into 
existence or how Britain and the United States so stipulate, this right will 
not be affected.”22
On April 28, 1952, the Republic of China signed a peace treaty with 
Japan.  Article 2 stipulated: “It is recognized that under Article 2 of the 
Treaty of Peace which Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on 8 Sep-
tember 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan 
has renounced all right, title, and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu 
(the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.”23
The problem caused by the stipulation of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty is analyzed as follows:
First of all, before 1936, the parties to the dispute over the Paracel 
Islands were only China and France, and then Japan which occupied some 
islands of the Paracel Islands in 1936 was later added.  In 1909, the Qing 
Dynasty put the Paracel Islands under the administration of Yat county 
of Guangdong Province.  The French Governor-General of Indochina 
brought the administration of the Paracel Islands into Thua Thien Prov-
ince of Vietnam (in Hué) on June 15, 1938.  Japan dispatched troops in 
1939 to occupy the Pratas Islands, the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly 
Islands, and incorporated these three Islands into the administration of 
Taiwan, which was the first time in history the three Islands were inte-
grated into an administrative system.
On June 10, 1919, the Japanese Laza Island Phosphorous Mine 
Corporation registered the mining right at the Tokyo District Court.  This 
should be the first time that the Spratly Islands were incorporated into an 
administrative jurisdiction.  The permission regarding the mining right 
22“Statement on the Draft of Peace Treaty of the USA and UK towards Japan and San 
Francisco Conference by Foreign Minister Chou Enlai, August 15, 1951,” in Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjian ji (er): 1951-1953 (Documents of Foreign 
Relations of the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 2 (1951-1953), ed. World Knowledge 
Publishing House (Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House, 1958), 32.
23Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, ed., Zhongwai tiaoyue jibian (minguo 
16 nian zhi 46 nian) (A Compilation of Treaties of China and Foreign Countries [1927-
1957]) (Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, 1958), 2.
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was allowed by Japan.  On March 23, 1925, the French Governor-General 
of Cochinchina decided (not publicly) to put the Spratly under the admin-
istration of Bac Ria Province of Cochinchina.
Before 1939, although China and France disputed the authority of 
the Paracel Islands and the Spratlys, which was also disputed with Japan, 
there was no one who owned or permanently occupied either the Paracel 
Islands or the Spratly Islands because they left after they established their 
stele or plain buildings.  Consequently, not one of the parties equipped 
the islands with any building or garrison for long-term occupation on the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands.
Second, when Japan occupied the Paracel and Spratly Islands after 
1939, Japan started out to build perpetual housing and sent officers to 
govern both islands.
Third, the Taiwan Executive Office of the Governor assigned per-
sonnel to head to Itu Aba Island to do research in November 1945.  In 
December 1945, the Republic of China sent Taiwanese weathermen to 
take over the Paracel Islands.  From November to December 1946, the 
Republic of China dispatched troops to take over the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands.  In January 1947, they formed a resolution that the area of the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands “is temporarily governed by the Navy and to 
wait till Hainan Special Administrative Zone was formed, the authority of 
two Islands will be under the Hainan Special Administrative Zone.”  Sub-
sequently, Navy Headquarters established an administrative office on the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands, respectively, and then stationed troops there. 
When the resolution was being made by the government of the Republic 
of China, France occupied Pattle Island, in the west part of the Paracel 
Islands; the Republic of China occupied Woody Island, in the east part of 
the Paracel Islands; and the troops of the Republic of China occupied the 
Spratly Islands.
Fourth, in September 1951, fifty-one countries in San Francisco dis-
cussed the peace treaty with Japan, but this meeting was not a function of 
the United Nations.  At that time, the Republic of China was a member of 
the UN, but she was not invited for political considerations; neither was 
the People’s Republic of China invited.  However, the parties disputing 
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over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, including France, Vietnam (ruled by 
King Bao-Da), and Japan were all present at the conference.  There was 
no doubt that those three countries should be limited by the peace treaty. 
However, the Republic of China needed also to follow the stipulations 
which were related to the terms of the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty because in terms of the treaty between the 
Republic of China and Japan, there were articles relevant to the renounce-
ment of the Paracel and Spratly Islands by Japan.
Fifth, in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the territory renounced 
by Japan was specified in Article 2 and there were six paragraphs list- 
ing the renounced territory which, except for the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands, included Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, the Kuril Islands, and part 
of Sakhalin.
Since the dispute over those islands mentioned above was raised 
by the participating countries before the conference and in the process 
of negotiation, and since the purpose of holding the meeting was to re-
build international peace by way of a discussion of the realm of Japanese 
territory, accordingly, in the meeting, the problematic territory was not 
dealt with by any resolution.  Thereupon, the great powers with decision- 
making rights decided to retain and solve the problem in the future.  John 
Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States, indicated after the 
conference: “Some Allied Powers suggested that Article 2 should not 
merely de-limit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify 
precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. 
This, admittedly, would have been neater, but it would have raised ques-
tions as to which there are now no agreed answers.”24  Therefore, the ar-
ticle only specified the renouncement by Japan.
Sixth, why were the Paracel and Spratly Islands recorded in the 
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty?
During the negotiation between Japan and the Republic of China, the 
24Daniel Patrick O’Connell, “The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Prob-
lem,” American Journal of International Law 50, no. 2 (April 1956): 406.
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clause referred to the renouncement of Taiwan, Penghu, and the Paracel 
and Spratly Islands, but did not mention the Kuril Islands and part of 
Sakhalin.  Did that indicate that Japan only renounced the territory as-
sociated with the Republic of China?  Daniel J. Dzurek said: “Moreover, 
according to the negotiating record Japan insisted that the renunciation 
article deal only with Chinese territory.  This shows that the ROC and 
Japan viewed the islands of Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Spratlys, and the 
Paracels as having similar status - that is, belonging to China.”25
Why were the Paracel and Spratly Islands referred to in the Sino-
Japanese Peace Treaty in particular, which is not on the list of the re-
nounced territories of Japan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty?  There are 
two reasons: first, in 1895, Japan obtained Taiwan and the Penghu Islands 
as ceded territory by treaty.  In the case of the three islands in the South 
China Sea occupied by Japan, those islands were incorporated by armed 
force, so there was not any relationship bound with the treaty.  According 
to the articles of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan’s renouncement of 
Taiwan was to satisfy the demands of the allies in the Cairo Declaration 
in 1943 and the Potsdam Proclamation in 1945.  The renouncing of the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea was argued by Britain. 
Japan incorporated the Pratas Islands, the Paracel and Spratly Islands into 
the administration of Taiwan in 1939, so it was a part of Taiwan.  Conse-
quently, when Japan renounced Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, the three 
islands were necessarily involved in the renouncement.  Second, since 
Japan negotiated the issue of renouncing Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, and 
the three islands of the South China Sea with the Republic of China, that 
should indicate that these territories were related to the Republic of China, 
otherwise the Paracel and Spratly Islands should not have been referred to 
in the treaty.26
25Daniel J. Dzurek, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who’s on First? (Durham: International 
Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, 1996), 16.
26During the negotiation between the ROC and Japan, the representative of the ROC, Hu 
Ching-yu, suggested that the Paracel and Spratly Islands had been the territory of China, 
and both islands were under the administrative jurisdiction of Taiwan, so he insisted on 
writing the two islands into the treaty.  Japan agreed to that suggestion.  See “Records of 
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The problem should focus on whether the renounced territory of 
Japan equals terra nullius or not.  In international law, terra nullius is de-
fined as territory which does not belong to any country and is not under 
the administrative jurisdiction of any sovereign state or instituted entity.
When France negotiated with Japan and asked whether signing the 
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty meant that Japan had transferred the Paracel 
and Spratly Islands to Taiwan, on May 23, 1952, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan sent a letter to the counterpart of France saying: “I con-
cur with your understanding that Article 2 of the Peace Treaty between 
Japan and the Republic of China signed on April 28, 1952 should not 
be construed as having any special significance or meaning other than 
that implied by Article 2, paragraph (f), of the Treaty of San Francisco.” 
Swedish scholar Stein Tonnesson argued based on this letter from Japan: 
“Thus, France could convince itself that in a subtle way it had nullified 
China’s gain.”27
Actually, Japan could not respond to questions beyond the Peace 
Treaty.  British premier, Sir Anthony Eden, replied to a member of the 
House of Commons during interpellation on February 4 1955: “Under the 
Peace Treaty of April 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, title and 
claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; but again this did not operate as a 
transfer to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People’s Republic of Chi-
na or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities.  Formosa and the Pescadores 
are, therefore, in the view of Her Majesty’s Government, territory the de 
jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined.”28  Probably 
the UK would not accept the case of Japan renouncing the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands as certain or determined.
Negotiation between the ROC and Japan on March 5, 1952,” in Zhong-Ri waijiao shiliao 
congbian (jiu): Zhonghua minguo dui Ri heyue (Historic Documents of Diplomacy be-
tween China and Japan, Vol. 9: The ROC and Japan Peace Treaty), ed. The Research So-
ciety of ROC’s Diplomatic Problem (Taipei: The Research Society of ROC’s Diplomatic 
Problems, 1966), 52-53; “Third Draft of Peace Treaty by Japan on March 28, 1952,” in 
ibid., 190.
27Tønnesson, “The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline,” 43.
28O’Connell, “The Status of Formosa,” 409.
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Nevertheless, both de facto and de jure, the Republic of China had 
already obtained the sovereignty of the Paracel and Spratly Islands from 
Japan since December 1945.  In January 1947, Macclesfield Bank, the 
Paracel, Spratlys, and Pratas Islands were all incorporated into the ter-
ritory of the Republic of China, which was under the administration of 
the Hainan Special Administrative Zone.  Although due to the scarcity 
of armed forces, the troops of the Republic of China retreated from the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands to Taiwan in May 1950, the ROC Govern-
ment did not officially announce a renunciation of the two islands.  The 
sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratlys by the Republic of China had 
been in force until April 28, 1952 and after, when the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty and Sino-Japan Peace Treaty came into force.  Therefore, the 
ROC’s claim of sovereignty over the two islands was consistent.  In 1951, 
Japan proclaimed that it was renouncing the Paracel and Spratly Islands 
for the agreement of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.  However, there is a 
question: Can the renouncement compete with the actual jurisdiction right 
of the Republic of China over both islands? The most significant point is 
that, although both islands theoretically became terra nullius when Japan 
renounced them, both de facto and de jure, the two islands groups could 
not be terra nullius.
An international jurist, Hungdah Chiu, quoted the principle of uti 
possidetis (first use of your property) from volume two of Oppenheim’s 
International Law edited by Hersch Lauterpacht, and claimed that the 
Republic of China was able to obtain the sovereignty of Taiwan and 
the Penghu Islands in terms of occupation first.  Oppenheim’s Interna-
tional Law states: “Unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the effect of a 
treaty of peace is that conditions remain as at the conclusion of peace. 
Thus, all moveable State property, such as munitions, provisions, arms, 
money, horses, means of transport, and the like, seized by an invading 
belligerent, remain his property, as likewise do the fruits of immoveable 
property seized by him.  Thus further, if nothing is stipulated regarding 
conquered territory, it remains in the hands of the possessor, who may 
annex it.  But it is nowadays usual, although not at all legally necessary, 
for a conqueror desirous of retaining conquered territory to secure its 
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cession in the treaty of peace.”29
Note 3 of the above-mentioned paragraph exemplified a case: the 
concealed cession related to Tripoli and Cyrenaica after the war between 
Turkey and Italy in 1912.  Turkey was loath to cede these territories with 
expressis verbis, but Italy strongly insisted on obtaining them.  Therefore, 
both parties signed a protocol on October 15, 1912 which stipulated that 
Turkey should permit the people’s liberty upon the two territories within 
three days and renounce authority over the territories.  Then, Turkey did 
so and signed a Peace Treaty on October 18.  So Italy announced that 
the two territories were to be annexed by them.  However, Giulio Diena 
believed that was not a concealed cession, but a renouncement by Turkey 
and a renounced land occupied by Italy first.30
The principle was often called the principle of uti possidetis, which 
means that an agent continues to keep the property that it already had. 
According to this principle, the Republic of China was enabled to obtain 
the Japanese territory which was put under the jurisdiction of Taiwan 
without any specification in the peace treaty in terms of the principle of 
uti possidetis.31
Nevertheless, is the principle of uti possidetis operable in the case of 
Japan renouncing the Paracel and Spratly Islands?  Similarities and dis-
similarities between the case of Tripoli and Cyrenaica and another case of 
the Paracel and Spratly Islands are listed below.
Similarities: Both territories were renounced.
Dissimilarities:
1. Italy compelled Turkey to renounce the territories of Tripoli and 
Cyrenaica within three days.  On the contrary, the Republic of China did 
not force Japan to renounce the islands as Italy did.  However, the San 
29Hersch Lauterpacht, ed., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. II, 7th edition Longmans, 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co Ltd., 1952), 611. 
30Ibid., 611, note 3.
31Hungdah Chiu, “Taiwan Penghu falü diwei wenti de yanjiu” (A Study of the Legal Status of 
Taiwan and the Pescardos,” in Guanyu Zhongguo lingtu de guojifa wenti lunji (Essays on 
Chinese Territory of International Law Issues), ed. Hungdah Chiu (Taipei: Taiwan Com-
mercial Press, 2004), 9.
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Francisco Peace Treaty was signed on September 8, 1951 and came into 
force on April 28, 1952.  The renouncement became effective on that date.
2. Italy immediately announced its incorporation of the territory in 
Tripoli and Cyrenaica after signing the treaty with Turkey, but the Repub-
lic of China did not proclaim its incorporation of the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands after signing the peace treaty with Japan as Italy did.
3. Tripoli and Cyrenaica were not under the domain of Italy before 
Turkey renounced the two lands.  However, before the peace treaty be-
tween Japan and the Republic of China in which Japan renounced the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands, the two islands had already been put into the 
domain of the Republic of China for six years.
The stipulation of renouncing the Paracel and Spratly Islands by 
Japan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty was made at the claim of Britain, 
which argued: “this treaty will leave the sovereignty open to dispute be-
tween Britain, France and any other nations who choose in future to inter-
est themselves in the islands, until the vacuum is filled and some claimant 
becomes able to exercise a more real and permanent sovereignty than has 
been possible hitherto.” The purpose of Britain was to put the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands under the effective jurisdiction of occupiers who were 
interested in the islands.  The stipulation of renounced territories causing 
the destruction of international order and more conflicts between coun-
tries was not the expectation of each country that attended the conference. 
Therefore, the “renouncement” could be defined in terms of uti possidetis 
in order to maintain the international peace.  No matter what the other did, 
the Republic of China adopted the principle of uti possidetis and continued 
to de facto and de jure occupy the Paracel and Spratly Islands which were 
renounced by Japan.
Seventh, before and after the signing of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty and Sino-Japan Peace Treaty, the Republic of China indeed gov-
erned the Paracel and Spratly Islands and included them in an official 
published map of Chinese territory.  On the other hand, France did not 
control or occupy any island of the Spratly Islands, nor did any official 
map show the Spratly Islands belonging to Vietnam which was ruled by 
France.  Since 1946 France had occupied such islands as Pattle of the 
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Paracel Islands.  France also put those islands into its administrative sys-
tem.  However, it did not draw any official map to indicate that the islands 
belonged to Vietnam which was ruled by France.  Moreover, the Philip-
pines did not exercise any occupation of the Spratly Islands; Vietnam was 
an Associated State of France, so it was not totally independent.32  Viet-
nam further did not actually occupy the Paracel and Spratly Islands.  The 
authority of Pattle was transferred from France to Vietnam.  It indicated 
that France had invaded Pattle Island with armed forces.  Therefore, such 
a transfer of territorial sovereignty is certainly not to be in force in inter-
national law.
In terms of the critical date in international law, if the effective date, 
April 28, 1952, of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Sino-Japan Peace 
Treaty, is set as the critical date,33 then the conflicts which occurred before 
that critical date should be recognized as disputes.  In other words, before 
the critical date, the disputant country will be a qualified party indeed, 
and its arguments would be taken into consideration by the court.  As to 
those new conflicts or newly-added pieces of evidence happening after 
the critical date, those disputant countries should not be recognized as au-
thentic disputant parties.  The claims related to the Spratly Islands made 
by France, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and the People’s Republic 
of China are not qualified anymore.  That is, the Republic of China should 
be the country that has the most superior legal justification compared to 
the other countries from the viewpoint of occupation, undertaking the ter-
ritories that Japan renounced, or uti possidetis.
32The State of Vietnam became an Associated State of France on March 8, 1949, to be 
semi-independent.  Monique Chemillier-Gendreau thinks the State of Vietnam had an 
international personality.  See Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty Over the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands, 90.
33Monique Chemillier-Gendreau suggested three critical dates referring to (1) Vietnam be-
came a protectorate state of France in 1884; (2) France suggested to China that it submit 
the controversy to the International Court of Justice in 1937; (3) France retreated from 
Vietnam and Vietnam entered onto the international stage in 1954/56.  See Chemillier-
Gendreau, Sovereignty Over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, 124.  In terms of legal 
perspective, these three dates are not compared to the superiority and legitimacy of the 
effective date of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
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Daniel Patrick O’Connell compared the postwar occupation of 
South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands by the Soviet Union to the case of 
Taiwan.  In the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union required that Japan 
return South Sakhalin and nearby islands, internationalize Da-Lien city, 
rent Port Arthur, and return the Kuril Islands after its surrender.  After the 
war, the Soviet Union occupied the two islands, South Sakhalin and the 
Kuril Islands, which were renounced by Japan, and became territories 
obtained by the Soviet Union .  The case of the Republic of China men-
tioned above was much the same.  The occupation of renounced territory 
could be applied to the case of Taiwan.  He indicated that “It is doubtful, 
therefore, whether there is any international law doctrine opposed to the 
conclusion that China (and in the case of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, 
the Soviets) appropriated the terra derelicta of Formosa by converting 
belligerent occupation into definitive sovereignty.”34  The inference was 
also suitable for the principle of occupation of the Paracel and Spratly Is-
lands by the Republic of China.
Eighth, the San Francisco Peace Treaty intended to resolve the prob-
lem of territories occupied by Japan’s prewar invasion and to ask Japan to 
renounce those acquisitions.  This case can also be applied to the invasion 
by France.  After the Peace Treaty came into force, France still occupied 
some islands of the Paracel Islands by armed force.  France’s action trans-
gressed the basic tenet of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
Even the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced their owner-
ship of the Spratly Islands rather than Vietnamese ownership in Septem-
ber of 1953.  When the French transferred Cochinchina to the State of 
Vietnam (Bao-Da regime) in 1949, the Spratly Islands were not involved. 
Therefore, the Spratly Islands ought to have been under the administration 
of the Ministry of Overseas France.35  In March 1956, the French govern-
ment declared again the above statement.36
34O’Connell, “The Status of Formosa,” 414.
35Tønnesson, “The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline,” 39.
36“Territorial Disputes over Ownership of Nansha and Paracel Islands,” Keesing’s Contem-
porary Archives 10 (September 1956): 15131. 
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By May 1954, French troops had left Vietnam because of losing the 
battle of Dien Bien Phu.  The islands they had occupied before should 
have waited for peaceful negotiation, rather than a unilateral transfer to 
Vietnam.  Vietnam could not inherit territories that were taken over by 
French invasion.  Consequently, in the conference of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, no one country supported the view raised by Vietnam.
Ninth, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was in force, France did 
not occupy any island in the Spratly Islands, so there was no possibility 
that Vietnam could obtain the Spratly Islands from France’s occupation. 
France, in September 1953, declared that the Spratly Islands belonged 
to herself rather than Vietnam.  Thus, obviously, Vietnam did not have a 
standpoint to proclaim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands being trans-
ferred from France.  The Philippines invaded the Spratly Islands in the 
1970s and Malaysia in the 1980s; both countries are disqualified as claim-
ant parties, because they are not the qualified disputant parties before the 
critical date related to the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
Conclusion 
The main purpose of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was to deal 
with the problem of peaceful coexistence with Japan and deprive Japan of 
its invaded territories before and during the war.  But each related country 
held different views on the Paracel and Spratly Islands, so the resolution 
was made that Japan was obliged to renounce the islands as a method to 
terminate the controversy.  The renouncement was treated as an action to 
assign the Paracel and Spratly Islands with the status of deserted islands 
without any sovereign administrator and with the possibility of being 
taken over by any powerful country at any time.  Although the aim of the 
Peace Treaty was not to judge the status of the islands’ legal sovereignty, 
an international conference mechanism should have specified that the 
dispute over the uncertain territories be arbitrated by the international 
court or be trusted temporarily to the United Nations.  However, these two 
islands involved conflicts among France, Britain, and China, so the con-
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troversy could not be settled by means of the above-mentioned measures.
Since December 1945, the Republic of China had completed the 
occupation and administrative governance of the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands; officers were sent there to govern the islands.  On September 8, 
1951, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed and came into force 
on April 28 the next year.  During that period, the authority over the two 
islands was exercised by the Republic of China and was in force indeed. 
In the conference of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, both the People’s 
Republic of China and the State of Vietnam proposed their sovereignty 
over the two islands, but the proposals were all rejected.  Since the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty and the Sino-Japan Peace Treaty had come into 
force, the Republic of China had the priority to occupy the two renounced 
territories.  No matter what the resolution of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty was or when it was in effect, the administration and legal jurisdic-
tion of the Republic of China over the two islands were not null and void 
in de facto and de jure terms.
In short, after the critical date of the signing of the Sino-Japan 
Peace Treaty and the time when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was in 
force, new disputant countries, whatever their arguments or activities of 
strengthening physical facilities on those islands, are disqualified as the 
disputant parties in terms of international law or maintaining international 
order.
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